Investor induced contagion during the banking and European sovereign debt crisis of 2007-2012::wealth effect or portfolio rebalancing? by Santamaria, Daniel & Petmezas, Dimitris
Investor Induced Contagion during the Banking and European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis of 2007-2012: Wealth Effect or Portfolio 
Rebalancing? 
 
Dimitris Petmezas and Daniel Santamaria* 
 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates the way a crisis spreads within a country and across borders by 
testing the investor induced contagion hypothesis through the liquidity channel on stock-
bond relationships of the US and five European countries before and during the global 
banking and European sovereign debt crisis of 2007-2012. We provide evidence consistent 
with the wealth effect as a source of contagion for the majority of countries. Nevertheless, 
we uncover evidence of investor induced contagion sourced by the portfolio rebalancing 
effect for correlations involving Spanish and Italian bonds during the debt crisis. Further, we 
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effects, which are offset by the opposite effects of risk aversion amongst investors, a 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most prominent characteristics in the recent financial crisis is the global loss of 
confidence in the financial system with unprecedented levels of risk aversion amongst 
investors, the lack of liquidity and freezing of the credit markets. The European sovereign 
debt crisis that followed was not entirely unexpected (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). In fact, 
the contagion effect of past crises, which is defined as the transmission mechanism that 
occurs during a financial crisis, continues to dominate the views of economists, academics 
and policy makers (Caporale et al., 2006 on the Asian financial crisis; Yang et al. , 2006 on 
the Russian crisis; and Ravichandran and Maloain, 2010 on the recent financial crisis).  
The objective of this study is to investigate what causes a crisis to spread by testing the 
investor induced contagion hypothesis on the relationship between stock and bond markets. 
In a recent paper, Boyer et al. (2006) suggested that investor induced contagion stems from 
either the wealth effect or the portfolio rebalancing hypothesis. Therefore, motivated by 
Boyer et al. (2006), we investigate whether investor induced contagion between stock and 
bond markets sources from the wealth effect or portfolio rebalancing hypothesis before and 
during the banking and European sovereign debt crisis over the period 2007-2012. 
Moreover, given that a prominent characteristic of the recent financial crisis was the collapse 
in confidence in the financial system, the third aim is to uncover cross regional evidence on 
the effect of credit market liquidity and level of risk aversion on the transmission channel of 
the stock-bond relationship. Both sources of risk provide a barometer on the liquidity in the 
financial system and the degree of investor uncertainty associated with taking on high risk 
assets. A crucial feature of the wealth effect and portfolio rebalancing hypothesis, especially 
in light of credit market liquidity and investor risk aversion, is the underlying assumption 
that a crisis spreads through the liquidity channel. This envisages a scenario where a shock 
causes liquidity in the financial system to decline. Hence, the wealth effect in a stock-bond 
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relationship stipulates that during a crisis , a shock to the funding constraints of investors 
causes risk aversion, a liquidation of positions, and an increase in volatility in both markets 
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009); similarly, under the portfolio rebalancing hypothesis, 
risk aversion and the associated decline in liquidity in the stock market from a shock 
encourages investors to sell high risk assets in search for quality (Chordia et al. , 2005; and 
Baur and Lucey, 2009).   
To test for investor induced contagion, we use the Dynamic Conditional Correlation 
(DCC) EGARCH to test the wealth effect versus portfolio rebalancing hypothesis on stock 
index and benchmark bond yield data at different times to maturity for the UK, US, France, 
Germany, Spain and Italy. A key feature of this approach is that proxies of credit market 
liquidity conditions and investor risk aversion are modelled within the conditional mean as 
the means of investigating the transmitting effects of both risk barometers on the 
transmission channel of the stock-bond relationship. The appealing feature of this 
framework is that we propose an asymmetric DCC estimator along the lines of Cappiello et 
al. (2006) that allows for conditional asymmetries to govern the dynamics of the stock-bond 
relationship. Additionally, we introduce a DCC(Z)-EGARCH risk factor model using 
interactive dummy variables on DCC estimates to identify whether the wealth effect and 
portfolio rebalancing hypothesis is sensitive to credit market stress and risk aversion under 
different market conditions. As a result, this allows us to draw fruitful conclusions on the 
drivers that cause a crisis to spread within a country and across borders. 
In brief, we report that stock-bond correlations strengthened considerably during the 
banking crisis for all countries. The increase in correlation is consistent with the investor 
induced contagion hypothesis caused by the wealth effect. However, for stock-bond 
correlations involving Spanish and Italian bonds, we report a dramatic decline in correlation 
and diminishing investor induced contagion immediately after the banking crisis up to 2009. 
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However, for both countries’ stock-bond relationships, we report investor induced contagion 
sourced by the portfolio rebalancing effect throughout the sovereign debt crisis from 2010-
2012. The inclusion of proxies for credit market liquidity conditions and investor risk 
aversion reveals further interesting results. We find that high levels of risk aversion magnify 
investor induced contagion sourced by the wealth effect during the banking crisis and by 
portfolio rebalancing effects during the debt crisis for correlations involving Spanish and 
Italian bonds. Despite this, the manifestation of investor induced contagion due to risk 
aversion is countered by the opposite effects of changes in credit market conditions, a 
finding that is not necessarily limited to crisis periods.  
This paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. Firstly, this study is the 
first to our knowledge to formally test the wealth effect versus portfolio rebalancing 
hypothesis on stock-bond relationships as a transmission mechanism that could explain how 
the banking crisis and sovereign debt crisis spread within a country and across borders. 
Therefore, our study deviates from the prior literature that focuses on contagion as a by-
product of the arrival of negative innovations (Billio and Pelizzon, 2003; Kim and 
Moshirian, 2004; and Baele, 2005). Secondly, we differentiate the banking and sovereign 
debt crisis as separate stages of the financial crisis and in doing so, we are able to extract 
information and draw fruitful conclusions on how stock-bond relationships not only change 
during a crisis but also in the dynamics that cause a crisis to spread. Finally, we investigate 
the feed through effects of key financial market indicators of credit market stress and 
investor risk aversion in the markets on the transmission mechanism before the crisis and 
during the banking and sovereign debt crisis. This is particularly important when 
investigating how a crisis spreads given that these variables contain useful information on 
credit market liquidity in the real economy and investor confidence (Brunnermeier, 2009; 
Melvin and Taylor, 2009; and Andersson et al., 2007). Therefore, this paper has important 
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implications in terms of how monetary authorities should respond in maintaining liquidity 
levels in the financial system especially during a crisis. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows; section 2 reviews the related literature. 
Section 3 introduces the DCC-EGARCH model and the transmission channel of credit 
market stress and risk aversion. Section 4 discusses the data and provides descriptive 
statistics. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Finally, a discussion of the results is 
presented in section 6, and section 7 conc ludes the paper. INTROU 
CTION 
2. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1. The Stock-Bond Relationship 
In early studies, Shiller and Beltratti (1992) and Campbell and Ammer (1993) hypothesized 
that the stock-bond relationship is constant over a period of time. However, the former study 
reported a strong negative relationship between stock prices and long maturity bond yields, 
which was inconsistent with the findings of Campbell and Ammer (1993). Although later 
studies have documented a time varying stock-bond relationship (Gulko, 2002; Connolly et 
al., 2005; and Jones and Wilson, 2004), they did not test for investor induced contagion 
between the stock and bond markets during normal market conditions and crisis periods. As 
a result, first and foremost, this paper tests the existence of investor induced contagion by 
identifying the time varying nature of correlation before and during the banking and debt 
crisis. 
Furthermore, little attention has been paid about the factors that drive this relationship. 
One factor that has been suggested by previous studies is the expected rate of inflation in the  
long run (Li, 2004). The intuition behind the use of this macroeconomic variable is that 
uncertainty surrounding an increase in forecasted inflation causes an increase in discount 
rates, thus leading to a fall in bond prices. Indeed, according to Li (2004), a stronger 
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correlation between stock and bond yields is observed following an increase in expected 
inflation. In a departure from prior literature, this paper introduces proxies for credit market 
liquidity and investor risk appetite as two potential drivers that represent barometers of 
liquidity in the interbank market and confidence in the financial markets.  
Given the role of credit market liquidity and the level of risk aversion as potential 
drivers of the stock-bond relationship, we depart from previous studies that find the source 
of contagion as a by-product of innovations (King and Wadhwani, 1990; Koutmos, 1996; 
and Wongswan, 2006) and risk premium (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). Instead, this study 
postulates that the stock-bond relationship is governed by the amount of liquidity in the 
financial system in which a shock leads to an overall decline in liquidity in the asset 
markets. One of the leading proponents of the liquidity channel in the stock-bond 
relationship is the study by Chordia et al. (2005). They hypothesized a relationship between 
liquidity induced by the microstructure of the market and macro induced liquidity as a 
means of providing important inferences on the main drivers of liquidity in both markets and 
hence, the stock-bond correlation. They reported a significantly positive relationship 
between stock and bond market volatility caused by shocks, with volatility being a major 
driver of liquidity.  
 
2.2.  Wealth Effect versus Portfolio Rebalancing  
Investor induced contagion and the liquidity channel that causes a crisis to spread, in view of 
credit market liquidity and investor risk aversion, nest neatly with two competing theorems 
by which this study tests the stock-bond relationship. The first one is the wealth effect 
developed by Kyle and Xiong (2001) and later tested by Boyer et al. (2006). In their paper, 
Kyle and Xiong developed a contagion model based on changes in risk appetite that is 
determined by the wealth effect of convergence traders. The wealth effect arises when 
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convergence traders incur losses due to negative shocks, thereby causing high levels of risk 
aversion and a liquidation of positions in the financial markets. According to the liquidity 
channel, this causes liquidity levels to decline and magnify the impact of the initial shock 
which inevitably transmits from one asset to the next. Therefore, under the wealth effect, the 
correlation between assets increases during a crisis and, thus, is consistent with investor 
induced contagion.  
However, the Kyle and Xiong’s model assumed the existence of two risky assets, 
which at a time of falling (rising) stock prices, leads to a decline ( increase) in liquidity, an 
increase (decrease) in volatility and, hence, increased correlation between assets. One 
implication of their model is that, when faced with high and low risk assets, investors at a 
time of falling stock prices will substitute growth for income. However, as income falls with 
declines in yields due to rising bond prices, convergence traders will be inclined to liquidate 
their positions in the bond market, thus causing a decline in liquidity. The Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen’s (2009) liquidity-funding model suggests that such a scenario is likely given that 
shocks to investors’ funding constraints encourage a liquidation of positions causing a 
“liquidity spiral” between the markets due to the fact that the risk of hitting capital limits 
increase. The funding illiquidity causes a decline in liquidity in both markets leading to an 
increase in volatility in both asset classes and, hence, an increase in the stock-bond 
correlation during a financial crisis.  
The alternative hypothesis tested is the portfolio rebalancing effect. This postulates a 
scenario where investors faced with falling (rising) stock prices, embark on a “flight to 
(from) quality” from (to) stocks. In such a scenario, investor induced contagion sourced by 
the portfolio rebalancing hypothesis is characterized by a decline in the correlation estimate 
in the event of a financial crisis. Like the wealth effect, proxies for credit market liquidity 
and investor risk aversion complement the portfolio rebalancing hypothesis through the 
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liquidity channel. In times of a crisis, a lack of liquidity in the transmission mechanism 
coupled with a high level of uncertainty will cause investors to look for low risk assets 
during major falls in stock prices. The prior literature in support of the portfolio rebalancing 
hypothesis within the context of a financial crisis is limited at best. Hartmann et al. (2004) 
report some evidence in favor of the portfolio rebalancing hypothesis when analyzing the 
stock-bond relationship amongst the G-5 countries; however, this is countered by contagion 
effects between both asset classes at different periods of time. On the other hand, Connolly 
et al. (2005) find evidence that negative relationships between stock and bond markets 
coincide with major stock market falls as investors rebalance their portfolios from high risk 
to low risk assets. However, focusing on the stock-bond relationships for eight major 
countries, Baur and Lucey (2009) report more conclusive evidence that “flight  to quality” is 
not only frequent during crisis periods , but it crosses borders, thus indicating the existence 
of “cross-country contagion”.   
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
The Exponential-GARCH (EGARCH) model, first introduced by Nelson (1991), has been 
amongst the most commonly used GARCH specifications that capture asymmetries in asset 
returns.
1
 For the purpose of this study, the EGARCH model is used to derive the 
standardized residual returns for stocks and bonds as inputs for the dynamic correlation 
model. We start with the EGARCH (p,q) specification for the conditional mean and 
variance: 
        ttR   1    
                                                             
1
 Early advocates of the EGARCH model point out the studies of French et al. (1987) and Schwert (1990) as 
uncovering an asymmetric effect in the data in addition to other stylized features such as volatility clustering, 
serial dependencies and long memory (Hentschel, 1995; and Andersen et al., 2001). Later studies continue to 
highlight the usefulness of EGARCH models in generating reliable volatility forecasts that is attributable to a 
well-specified model (Brandt and Jones, 2006). According to Alberg et al. (2008), the forecasting performance 
of the EGARCH model outperforms other asymmetric GARCH model specifications when applied to Tel Aviv 
stock market. 
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where 2
t  denotes the conditional variance stock market returns and bond yields, and 1 t  is 
the innovation term that comprises the theta 1  coefficient that captures the asymmetric 
component.
2
  
Using the standardised residual returns 2
ttts   generated by equation (1) as 
inputs, we propose the dynamic correlation coefficient (DCC) structure, first introduced by 
Engle (2002) to test the wealth effect versus the portfolio rebalancing hypothesis. The DCC 
model has the appealing structure that allows conditional correlation estimates to be time 
varying, a notion that requires decomposing into the following:   
     (2) 
where  2
tt diagD   and  is the correlation matrix of time varying standardized residual 
returns that leads the structure of the DCC model for assets i and j 
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where the term  denotes the matrix of unconditional covariance of the standardised errors 
from equation (1) that leads to the DCC matrix 1* ,,,,
1*  tjitjit qqqR  from which the 
components of 
tR  are computed using  
tjti
tji
tji
qq
q
,,
,,
,,      (4) 
where 
tji ,,  represents the DCC estimates for assets i and j respectively. An increase in tji ,,  
during a crisis period is consistent with investor induced contagion, sourced by the wealth 
effect. Conversely, a decline in 
tji ,,  suggests support for investor induced contagion 
sourced by the portfolio rebalancing hypothesis. Combined with the EGARCH model, the 
                                                             
2
 To maximise the log likelihood function, the Berndt, Hall, Hall & Hausman (1974) (BHHH) algorithm is 
proposed in this paper. Given that ARCH processes are highly nonlinear, maximising the log likelihood 
function on the assumption that the conditional density is normal renders the optimisation process invalid. 
Hence, the BHHH algorithm relaxes this restriction to obtain the log likelihood function by utilizing the 
covariance of the analytic gradients for each observation to form the conditional covariance matrix.  
tttt DRDH 
tR
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DCC structure of equations (3) and (4) is reminiscent of the asymmetric DCC estimator of 
Cappiello et al. (2006) in that it allows for conditional asymmetries to govern the dynamics 
of the stock-bond relationship. Furthermore, the DCC model proposed can be adapted to 
capture the transmission effects of credit market liquidity and investor risk aversion from the 
univariate EGARCH model by expanding the conditional mean of equation (1) so that the 
following transmission channel tjitttt Rqs ,,
*    is envisaged. 
A major implication of the DCC-EGARCH model is that the maximum likelihood 
function needs to be modified to take into account the DCC estimator so that the following 
quasi-maximum likelihood estimates (QMLE) is maximised:
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where   represents the constant and  |  denotes the sum of the univariate variance 
generated by the EGARCH model conditional of the correlation parameters. Next, we 
proceed to describe the data used in this study followed by a preliminary empirical analysis.  
 
4. DATA  
4.1.  The Data  
The database comprises of daily index returns on the FTSE-100, Russell 3000, CAC-40, 
DAX-30, IBEX-35 and the FTSE MIB Index from January 1, 2004 to September 6, 2012 (n 
= 2,266 observations). The choice of stock markets was determined by the degree of 
coverage and of diversification in each index. For instance, the FTSE-100 Index lists the 100 
largest blue chip companies that make up 84% of the total market capitalization in the UK. 
Given that the US is the origin country of the banking crisis, the US market is represented 
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by the Russell 3000, which covers the 3000 largest public limited companies and, as such, 
represents 98% of the total market capitalization of US stocks. The CAC-40 lists the 
performance of the top 40 largest stocks on Paris Euronext based on market capitalization. 
In turn, the DAX-30 represents the Frankfurt Stock Exchange listing of the top 30 blue chip 
companies that represent 80% of the total market capitalization. To proxy southern 
European countries, the IBEX-35 consists of 35 of the most liquid stocks listed on the 
Madrid Stock Exchange General Index and the FTSE MIB Index represents 40 of the largest 
and most liquid stocks by capitalization that are traded on the Borsa Italiana. 
For short and long term interest rates, our database includes the FTSE Global 1-3 year 
and 10+ year government benchmark bond yields for the UK, US, France and Germany. The 
1-3 year index is defined as the aggregate of benchmark indices of bond yields from one to 
three years to maturity for each country. Similarly, the 10+ year index represents the 
aggregate of the indices for ten years and longer to maturity. Due to data limitations, we 
collected interest rate data on three year bond yields for Spain and Italy as well as ten year 
benchmark bond yields for both countries.
3
 
To generate proxies for credit market liquidity conditions and investor risk aversion, 
we have also collected daily three month LIBOR rates, three month interest rate data and 
implied volatility index values (VIX) for the same countries from Datastream. However, in 
relation to the implied volatility index, the absence of data for both Spain and Italy means 
that VIX index for the Euro-zone (EU) was used to proxy investor confidence.  
 
4.2.  The T-bill Euro Dollar (TED) Spread 
To proxy for credit market liquidity conditions in the real economy, we computed the three 
month TED spread based on the London Interbank Offering Rate (LIBOR) and three month 
                                                             
3
 For the remainder of the paper, 1-3 year and 10+ year benchmark yields will be referred to as short dated and 
long dated bond yields respectively. 
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interest rates. The LIBOR, which is the expected average rate of interest over the life time of 
interbank loans, reflects default risk levels and wholesale market liquidity. Indeed, Taylor 
and Williams (2009) argue that increases in LIBOR are attributable to higher interest rates 
demanded by lenders for taking higher default risk in times of market stress. This is 
reflected by the spike in the TED spread shown in Figure 1 for the UK, US, France, 
Germany, Spain and Italy as the average rate of interest charged by banks increased as 
liquidity dried up during the height of the banking crisis.
4,5
  
[Please Insert Figure 1 About Here]  
Other measures of credit market liquidity risk, such as Credit Default Swap (CDS) 
spreads, are not considered in this study given recent evidence that they are not fully 
attributable to credit market liquidity risk factors (Collin-Dufresne et al. 2001, Blanco et al. 
2005). Additionally, the behavior of CDS spreads during the recent financial crisis has 
raised more questions regarding the usefulness of this measure of credit market liquidity risk 
as a leader of other markets. For instance, Forte and Peña (2009) and Norden and Weber 
(2009) both find that global stock markets tend to lead the CDS and bond markets more 
frequently than the opposite. By contrast, the TED spread, as a barometer of credit market 
liquidity, has received attention in a growing body of literature. For instance, Lashgari 
(2000) uses the TED spread as an independent variable on the S&P 500 index returns and 
reports a negative and significant coefficient. The intuition is that a widening TED spread 
signifies deteriorating liquidity conditions thus leading to a liquidation of positions and net 
portfolio outflows. In later studies, Brunnermeier (2009) and Melvin and Taylor (2009) 
                                                             
4
 The appealing feature of the TED spread is that it comprises the three month interest rate OIS-LIBOR spread. 
This represents the cost of three month liquidity from the perception of banks that is defined in terms of the 
risk attached to undertaking unsecured lending over the three months versus unsecured lending for one day. 
Further, the TED spread also incorporates the three month interest rate OIS spread, which contains a demand 
driven component that in a crisis causes portfolio managers to reallocate their portfolios away from high risk to 
low risk assets. The implication is a fall in yields and a widening of the TED spread. 
5
 The negative TED spread for Spain is attributable to a spike in three month interest rates that coincided with 
Moody’s downgrade of Spanish sovereign debt in October 2011. The short term interest rate, which peaked at 
5.06% in November 2011, represents investors’ expectations that the country will default on its debt 
obligations. 
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demonstrate the usefulness of the TED spread as a measure of liquidity in the wholesale 
market. For instance, the former study postulates that banks borrowing in the interbank 
market during a crisis tend to be charged a higher LIBOR and, thus, regard short term bonds 
a more attractive proposition given that they are considered as risk free; this leads to a spike 
in the TED spread as shown in Figure 1.  
 
4.3.  Implied Volatility (VIX) Index 
The implied volatility index (VIX) first introduced by the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
(CBOE) in 1993 and revised in 2003 is regarded by markets as a measure of investor fear. 
For the purpose of this study, we used daily VIX index values based on the revised 2003 
methodology. In short, this incorporates the S&P 500 index and averages the weighted 
prices of out-of-the-money puts and calls over a range of strike prices to estimate the 
implied volatility of stock index options. As a result , the high index readings between late 
October 2008 and March 2009 observed in Figure 2 are representative of high volatility 
associated with large stock market downturns.  
[Please Insert Figure 2 About Here]  
Realizing the information content of the VIX index, an increasing number of studies 
have used the implied volatility index as an independent variable within the GARCH 
framework (Blair et al. , 2001; and Koopman et al., 2005). Both studies reported a major 
improvement in the performance of daily GARCH models after adding realized volatility 
and the VIX implied volatility index as explanatory variables into the variance equation. 
However, this paper makes an important departure from previous studies in the use of the 
VIX index. In particular, we use the information uncovered in the VIX index to establish 
whether investor risk aversion magnifies investor induced contagion sourced by the wealth 
effect or portfolio rebalancing hypothesis in the stock-bond relationship before and during 
crisis periods. For instance, unlike previous studies, to capture the impact of pre-crisis, 
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banking crisis and debt crisis periods , we include the implied volatility measure into the 
conditional mean as interaction dummy variables for each of the three sub-periods. Low 
(2004) provides intuition behind this, postulating that the VIX index contains useful 
information on option trader’s perception of risk, and demonstrates how risk perceptions and 
price are related. As a result, in this paper, the VIX index proxies for investor confidence as 
a potential driving force behind the stock-bond relationship.  
 
4.2.3.  Preliminary Analysis and Descriptive Statistics 
As a starting point, Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and unconditional correlation 
analysis on stock and bond market returns. We show that average stock returns are generally 
positive for the entire sample period with the exception of the IBEX-35 and FTSE MIB 
indexes. The positive stock index returns coincide with negative bond yields at long and 
short maturities where the UK short dated bond yields reported the largest loss of 15.92%. 
This contrasts Spanish bond yields at long and short maturities which recorded an increase 
of 1.3% and 1.6% respectively over the same period.  
 [Please Insert Table 1 About Here] 
Focusing on the unconditional correlation matrix, the stock-bond relationship varies 
considerably from relatively strong and positive readings involving UK and US bond yields 
to weak and negative for Spanish and Italian bonds. By discovering a relatively strong 
positive stock-bond correlation points to a generalized wealth effect whereas evidence of a 
weak and negative relationship introduces the possibility of a portfolio rebalancing effect. 
These findings will be of particular interest when we estimate the DCC model later in the 
paper. 
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5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
5.1.  DCC-EGARCH Model Estimations 
A major characteristic of the recent banking crisis and European sovereign debt crisis is the  
unconventional tools employed by central banks across the globe through the 
implementation of various quantitative easing (QE) programmes. For instance, both the US 
Federal Reserve and Bank of England embarked on large scale asset purchasing programs 
that involved long term government bonds (Gagnon et al. , 2011 for the US; Joyce et al., 
2011 for the UK; and Neely, 2011 for the international bond market). On the other hand, the 
European Central Bank (ECB) embarked on a covered bond purchasing programme as a 
means of reviving the long term debt market used by banks to refine loans to the public and 
private sectors.  
The scale of central bank intervention means that we have to adjust for the effects of 
QE in the EGARCH model and standardized residual returns as inputs into the DCC 
structure of equation (3). Hence, we begin with the conditional mean equation: 



2,1
,11,,
j
ttjtji DR     (6) 
where 
tjD ,  are dummy variables designed to capture the effects of QE on stock returns and 
bond yields. The term j = 1,2 provides flexibility in the specified model by isolating the 
effects of different stages in the asset purchasing programmes on the stock and bond 
markets.
6
 However equation (6) is restrictive in that it does not model the transmitting 
                                                             
6
 For instance, for the UK market, we use two dummy variables; QE1 and QE2 (k=1,2) to represent two major 
policy advances from the Bank of England. For QE1, Dj,t = 1 between 5
th
 March 2009 to 30
th
 November 2009, 
and zero otherwise. This covers the initial asset purchase programme of £200bn in long term conventional 
gilts. The QE2 dummy variable is designed to capture the effects of three further rounds of QE from October 
2011 to 6
th
 September 2012. As such, Dj,t = 1 from the 10
th
 October 2011 onwards, and zero otherwise. 
Similarly, for the Federal Reserve, we employ two dummy variables to control for the impact of QE1 and QE2. 
For QE1, Dj,t = 1 represents the period November 2008 to March 2010, and zero otherwise. This coincides with 
the acquisition of $1.25trillon in Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS), $200bn in Federal Agency debt followed 
by $300bn in long term government bonds. On the other hand, with QE2, Dj,t = 1 covers the time period from 
November 2010 until end of June 2011, when a second wave of asset purchasing was announced which 
involved buying up to $600bn in long term government bonds. In relation to the ECB, we earmarked two 
major policy decisions to define our dummy variables. The first dummy variable Dj,t = 1 covers a twelve month 
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effects of changes in liquidity conditions and the level of risk aversion under different 
market conditions. As a result, we expand equation (6) to enable feed through effects into 
the DCC model so that:   
  
  
 
2,1 3,2,1 3,2,1
1,21,1,11,,
j k k
ttkktkktjtji VIXDTEDDDR   (7)
 
where k  =1,2,3 represents interactive dummies that denote the pre-crisis period, the banking 
crisis and sovereign debt crisis, respectively. The coefficients 
1,1  to 3,2  measure the 
impact of the TED spread and VIX index before and during the banking crisis followed by 
the debt crisis. The pre-crisis represents the period 1
st
 January 2004 to 27
th
 November 2006; 
the banking crisis from 28
th
 November 2006 to 15
th
 October 2009; and finally, the European 
debt crisis from 16
th
 October 2009 to 6
th
 September 2012.
7
 Hence, to generate the 
standardized residual returns  tt h  for the DCC model, adjusted for the effects of QE, 
credit market liquidity and investor risk aversion, involves estimating the following 
EGARCH (1,1) model on stock index returns and bond yields denoted as assets i and j 
respectively: 
  1,,21,,10,, logexp   tjitjitji ahaah    (8) 
where tjih ,,  is the conditional variance at time t and 1,, tji  is the information component 
that contains the asymmetric term 1 . Table 2 provides estimations from the DCC-
EGARCH (1,1) model on all return series for the whole sample. Given the volume of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
period between June 2009 and June 2010, to coincide with the covered bond purchasing programme. The 
second dummy variable Dj,t = 1 is defined as the period 10
th
 May 2010 until 6
th
 September 2012 that coincides 
with the setting up of the Securities Market Programme (SMP) and the re-introduction of the Long Term 
Refinancing Operation (LTRO). 
7
 The three sub-periods used are derived from the definition of the banking crisis period provided by the Bank 
of International Settlements (2009) Annual Report. The sovereign debt crisis period coincides with the 
downgrade of Greece in December 2009 and the start of the next stage of the global financial crisis as 
stipulated by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).  
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results, only coefficients that are statistically significant at least at the 10% level are reported 
in the conditional mean equation. 
A number of important observations can be made from these findings. After adjusting 
for the effects of QE, we find that stock market returns appear to be relatively insensitive to 
changes in the TED spread and VIX index. By contrast, both short and long dated bond 
yields are sensitive to the TED spread and VIX index, with the exception of German and to 
a lesser extent French and Italian benchmark bonds. The negative statistical significance of 
the TED spread and VIX index provide preliminary indications of a flight to (from) quality 
as a potential source of contagion due to tighter (relaxed) credit liquidity conditions and 
increased (falling) risk aversion (Chordia et al., 2005; and Baur and Lucey, 2009). Although 
this finding is generally robust to bonds of different times to maturity regardless of market 
conditions, evidence in favor of the portfolio rebalancing hypothesis is counterbalanced by 
the insensitivity of stock index returns to changes in credit market liquidity and investor risk 
aversion.  
[Please Insert Table 2 About Here] 
Focusing on the conditional variance equation, the parameters  121 ,, aa  are 
statistically different from zero, thus indicating the presence of EGARCH effects regardless 
of asset class and time to maturity. Closer inspection of the results reveals that volatility is 
persistent across all asset returns with the exception of UK long dated bond yields, a finding 
that coincides with the news innovation coefficient 2a , which is dominated by the 
asymmetric component 1 . In contrast, the estimated theta 1  is positive and statistically 
significant for long dated Spanish bond yields , as well as short and long dated Italian bonds, 
which coincides with high innovation coefficient 2a estimates. Nevertheless, all other model 
estimates show that asset returns (both stock and bond index returns) exhibit asymmetries, a 
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finding that differs from the results reported by Cappiello et al. (2006), who find little 
evidence of an asymmetric effect in the conditional volatility of bond index yields.  
 
5.2.  Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) Analysis 
Using the standardized residual returns generated by the EGARCH model of Table 2, we 
estimate DCC coefficients using equation (4) to test if the investor induced contagion 
hypothesis holds and whether this is caused by the wealth effect or portfolio rebalancing 
effect during crisis and non-crisis periods. As implied by Boyer et al. (2006), for investor 
induced contagion sourced by the wealth effect to hold, stock-bond correlation tji ,,  must 
increase in times of crisis. Conversely, for investor induced contagion to hold through the 
portfolio rebalancing hypothesis, the stock-bond correlation tji ,,  must decline during a 
crisis period.  
To take into consideration that the transmission channel linking stock and bond 
markets may vary over time, Figure 3 plots the time varying correlation estimations tji ,,  on 
stock-bond relationships for the entire sample period. The stock-bond correlation estimates 
exhibit a number of interesting features; for instance, the correlation estimates vary quite 
considerably over time, with a decline in tji ,,  observed before the banking crisis especially 
for stock-bond relationships involving long dated bonds. For c orrelations involving bond 
yields of the UK, US, France and Germany, tji ,,  increased during the banking crisis and 
sovereign debt crisis , thus indicating investor induced contagion is caused by a wealth 
effect. In all cases tji ,, increased sharply in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers and US House of Representatives rejection of the $700bn financial bailout in 2008, 
thus suggesting widespread systemic risk on the financial system (Acharya et al., 2009).  
However, for Spain and Italy, tji ,,  declined dramatically immediately after the banking 
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crisis indicating that investor induced contagion diminished until 2009. However, from 
2010, we report investor induced contagion sourced by the portfolio rebalancing hypothesis 
as tji ,,  became negative during the debt crisis. Additionally, the sharp decline in stock-
bond correlations that involve French bonds appears to coincide with France’s AAA 
downgrade in early 2012. The volatile nature of DCC estimates especially during the 
sovereign debt crisis, suggests that the spread of the crisis is the result of a portfolio 
rebalancing effect caused by a “flight to quality”, which has a destabilizing effect across 
asset classes at a time of falling stock prices in the smaller markets.
8
 This is consistent with 
the findings of previous studies that have documented a negative impact of ratings 
downgrades on the stock markets (Behr and Güttler, 2008; and Bannier and Hirsch, 2010). A 
notable feature is the robustness of these results in all maturities that is not only country-
specific but crosses borders.
 9
  
An issue of particular interest raised by the results is the trend in correlation estimates  
involving UK, US, French and German bonds and how this contrasts with stock-bond 
relations involving Spanish and Italian bonds in the aftermath of the banking crisis. This 
indicates that there are different forces at work in the transmission channels of the stock-
bond relationship. For instance, the increase in tji ,,  involving bond yields irrespective of 
time to maturity for the UK, US, France and Germany during the sovereign debt crisis, at a 
time of rising stock prices in the major markets, uncovers investor induced contagion that 
coincides with the purchase of long term government debt under the QE programmes. An 
                                                             
8
 For instance, whilst the FTSE 100, Russell 3000 and DAX30 all increased by 11.31%, 32.70% and 24.79%, 
respectively during the debt crisis period, this contrasts with the performance of stock markets in the epicentre 
of the crisis, such as the CAC40, IBEX35 and FTSEMIB indexes, which all declined by 11.18%, 29.04% and 
34.66%, respectively.   
9
 Further support for the portfolio rebalancing hypothesis is reported for correlations involving Spanish and 
Italian bonds during the debt crisis by re-estimating the DCC model on bond yields for all countries. 
Additional robustness tests were carried out by estimating the DCC model on stock-bond relationships 
involving Euro-zone short and long dated bond yields. We find investor induced contagion caused by the 
wealth effect is evident during the banking crisis, whereas for the debt crisis, the portfolio rebalancing effect is 
the dominant source of contagion especially for EU short dated bonds. Although the results are not presented 
in the paper, they are available upon request.   
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implication of the contagion model of Kyle and Xiong (2001) and a persistently high stock-
bond correlation suggests an increase in the amount of liquidity in both the stock and bond 
markets due to global central bank intervention. This finding is in marked contrast to the 
decline in tji ,,  involving Spanish and Italian bonds regardless of maturity, which is 
suggestive of portfolio rebalancing by investors. However, it is also worth noting that this 
may have been triggered by ratings downgrades of Spanish and Italian sovereign debt and 
the subsequent ECB intervention in the international bond markets.
10
 
 [Please Insert Figure 3 About Here] 
The remainder of this paper empirically investigates the feed through effects of a change in 
credit market liquidity conditions using the TED spread and investor confidence based on 
implied volatility estimates on the transmission channel of the stock-bond relationship.  
 
5.3.  DCC(Z)-EGARCH Risk Factor Model Analysis  
To begin with, we re-estimated the EGARCH model using the conditional mean model of 
equation (6) that excludes the TED spread and VIX index to generate the standardized 
residual returns as inputs into the DCC model. Following this, we formulated the DCC(Z)-
EGARCH risk factor model derived from equation (4): 
      tjtittji hhZh ,,,,      (9) 
in which   11  tZ  is an increasing function of tZ , which in turn denotes a 1K  
vector of proxies for credit market stress and investor confidence that are used as 
determinants of the correlation coefficient. As a result, equation (9) represents a useful way 
of identifying the transmitting effects of both factors that cause an increase (decrease) in the 
wealth effect or portfolio rebalancing process during crisis and non-crisis periods. To 
                                                             
10
 Spain’s credit rating was downgraded by S&P from AA+ to AA in April 2010, Moodys also downgraded 
Spanish debt from Aa2 to A1 in October 2011. Italian sovereign debt was downgraded from A+ to A by S&P 
in September 2011.  
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identify different market conditions, interactive dummy variables were introduced into the 
following risk factor model specification of the DCC function: 
    
 
  1'exp1
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
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tbak
tbak
t
Z
Z
Z    (10)  
where    kijk 11211,1 ,.....,,..,   and  kt zzzZ ,.....,,.., 20  in the home country a and 
foreign country b.
11
 We define 
k1  as the coefficients to be estimated for interactive dummy 
variables that are designed to capture the impact of both confidence indicators from 
countries a and b before and during the banking and debt crises. Therefore, the exogenous 
variables used are the TED spread and implied volatility index (VIX) of Figures 1 and 2 for 
each country of origin.
12
  
The interactive dummy parameters for the TED spread are denoted as 
1311 ,.....,  and 
1614 ,.....,  for the VIX index where coefficient numbers [11]-[14], [12]-[15], and [13]-[16] 
capture the periods before the crisis, the banking crisis, and sovereign debt crisis, 
respectively.
13
 Tables 3 and 4 present the estimation results from the DCC(Z)-EGARCH risk 
factor model of equation (9) for stock-bond correlations involving short and long dated bond 
yields. Given the volume of results, the most significant findings are reported. Therefore, 
Table 3 reports stock-bond correlations that include the stock markets of the US, France, 
Spain and Italy for short dated bonds. For Table 4, stock-bond relationships involving long 
                                                             
11
 10  represents constants and k = 0,........,6 represents the number of parameters used to estimate the lagged 
correlation coefficient estimates and proxies for credit market liquidity and investor risk appetite during the 
pre-crisis, banking crisis and sovereign debt crisis periods, respectively.  
12
 The usefulness of the TED spread as a measure for credit market liquidity is well known, whereas for the 
VIX index, the information contained has been found to cause a decoupling between bond and stock prices, 
especially during bouts of risk aversion (Andersson et al., 2007).  
13
 The interactive dummies for the TED spread and VIX index are defined as 
TEDbaba  1,........, ,,13,,11  and VIXbaba  1,........, ,,16,,14 , and zero otherwise. To maintain 
consistency within the analysis, the sample periods used to define all interactive dummies are the same as 
before. 
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dated bond yields present results for France.
14
 Furthermore, only statistically significant 
coefficients are reported up to the 5% level.  
Turning to our findings, there are some notable features identified in the results; 
firstly, there is limited evidence that the TED spread and VIX index are the driving forces 
behind the stock-bond relationships before the banking crisis, in spite of earlier findings 
presented in Table 2 on short and long dated bond yields. Focusing on the banking crisis, we 
report some evidence that a widening of TED spreads reduces stock-bond correlations that 
include the Russell 3000 and DAX-30 indexes for long dated bond yields. This suggests that 
it reduces investor induced contagion sourced by the wealth effect, thus indicating evidence 
that funding illiquidity that leads to deteriorating liquidity conditions (Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen, 2009) caused some rebalancing of portfolios away from high risk assets towards 
quality (Chordia, et al., 2005; and Baur and Lucey, 2009). Nevertheless, risk aversion 
measured by the VIX index is a relatively more dominant driver behind the increase in 
stock-bond correlations involving the Russell 3000, IBEX-35 and FTSE MIB indexes, a 
finding that is consistent with the wealth effect.
15
 Interestingly, we uncover a spillover effect 
of risk aversion originating from foreign country b, which explains the increase in stock-
bond correlations involving the CAC-40 for short dated bond yields. Spillover effects 
involving the TED spread and VIX index are also reported for correlations that incorporate 
the IBEX-35 index. Both results suggest that risk aversion levels and credit market liquidity 
conditions are not necessarily country-specific drivers of the asset markets, which implies 
that both factors may be determinants of cross-asset market volatility that crosses borders 
(Bianconi et al. , 2013). Results on the debt crisis reveal that both the TED spread and the 
                                                             
14
 In relation to stock-bond relationships that involve the FTSE-100, we find that stock-bond correlations are 
relatively insensitive to credit market illiquidity and high levels of risk aversion. However, for correlations 
involving the DAX Index with short dated bonds, we find some evidence that risk aversion explains the wealth 
effect. Although these findings are not presented here, the results are available upon request.  
15
 According to the modified contagion model, this implies that risk aversion may arise from shocks to the 
funding constraints of investors resulting in a liquidation of positions in the asset markets (Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen, 2009), which, in turn, lead to higher volatility and an increase in stock-bond correlations.  
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level of risk aversion are the main drivers behind the wealth effect and portfolio rebalancing 
hypotheses. On the one hand, finding a negative relationship between the TED spread and 
stock-bond correlations involving the Russell 3000 once again suggests that a narrowing of 
spreads observed in Figure 2 magnifies the wealth effect with the exception of correlations 
involving Spanish and Italian bonds.
16
 On the other hand, the positive association between 
risk aversion and stock-bond correlations for the Russell 3000 and to a lesser extent, the 
CAC-40, IBEX-35 and FTSE MIB indexes involving short dated bonds implies that it  
contributes to the increase in the wealth effect. For correlations involving particularly Italian 
bonds, risk aversion contributes significantly to the increase in contagion sourced by the 
portfolio rebalancing effect. 
         [Please Insert Table 3 About Here] 
         [Please Insert Table 4 About Here] 
 
5.4.  Credit Liquidity Conditions, Risk Aversion and the DCC Estimates  
So far, the results suggest that in general, the dominant force behind investor induced 
contagion during the crisis is the wealth effect for correlations involving the stock markets 
of the UK, US, France and Germany. For Spain and Italy, investor induced contagion is 
caused by the portfolio rebalancing hypothesis, which seems to be the main driver during the 
debt crisis. However, the statistical significance of the TED spread and VIX index reported 
in Table 2 poses a question on the impact of credit market liquidity and risk aversion on the 
transmission channel that governs the stock-bond relationship. Figure 4 plots the difference 
between the DCC estimates using the standardized residual returns from the EGARCH 
model with and without the TED spread and VIX index in the conditional mean. A 
manifestation of the wealth effect due to credit market liquidity conditions, risk aversion or 
                                                             
16
 This implies that a relaxation of credit market liquidity conditions encourages investors to participate in the 
stock markets at a time of more relaxed funding constraints (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009) and high bond 
market liquidity due to the large asset purchasing programmes (Gagnon et al., 2011; Joyce et al., 2011; and 
Neely, 2011). 
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both during the banking and sovereign debt crises is represented by readings greater than 
zero. Conversely, the inducement of the portfolio rebalancing effect is identified by readings 
less than zero.  
Noticeably, the impact of credit market illiquidity and the level of risk aversion are 
generally more persistent on stock-bond correlations that incorporate short dated bonds than 
relationships with longer dated bonds especially during the banking crisis. For instance, a 
manifestation of the wealth effect is reported for correlations involving the Russell 3000 
index and, in particular, stock-bond relationships that include UK short dated bonds. Based 
on the Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) model, this suggests that a lack of liquidity and 
increased funding constraints imposed on investors following the arrival of shocks cause an 
increase in risk aversion and a further decline in liquidity in both markets. Yet despite this, 
the inclusion of both risk barometers has tended to reduce investor induced contagion 
sourced by the wealth effect for correlations involving Spanish short dated bonds. The above 
results are repeated for the period of the debt crisis at a time of narrow TED spreads (see 
Figure 1) indicating relaxed credit liquidity conditions and low VIX index readings with the 
exception of two periods of risk aversion in 2010 and 2012 (see Figure 2). However, the 
most notable exception here is the stock-bond relationships involving Spanish short dated 
bonds and the IBEX-35 with Italian bonds where a manifestation of the portfolio 
rebalancing effect is reported. Finally, a striking feature for stock-bond relationships 
involving long dated bond yields is the sensitivity of DCC estimates to the inclusion of the 
TED spread and VIX index, especially for correlations that include UK bonds , which is not 
necessarily restricted to crisis periods. This is hardly surprising in light of the EGARCH 
results of Table 2 where UK bond yields appear to be very sensitive to credit market 
liquidity and the level of risk aversion before the banking crisis.  
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6. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
The results presented in this paper offer important insights into how a crisis spreads. Finding 
evidence that stock-bond correlations are volatile from pre-crisis to the banking and 
European sovereign debt crisis indicates that the transmission mechanism that defines the 
correlation of assets does vary in different market conditions (Forbes and Rigobon, 2000, 
2002), a finding that is also consistent with the results of Gulko (2002) and Fleming et al.  
(1998, 2003). Most importantly, it provides support to the investor induced contagion 
hypothesis.  
We have also established an increase in stock-bond correlations during the banking 
crisis that is indicative of a wealth effect and, as such, is consistent with the implications 
derived from the contagion model postulated by Kyle and Xiong (2001), after re laxing the 
assumption of a two high risk asset markets. However, this differs from the key findings of 
Baur and Lucey (2009) who reported evidence of flight to quality regularly occurring during 
crisis periods; nevertheless, their time frame considered the pre-2007 banking crisis period. 
Intuitively, the increase in correlation observed during the banking crisis appears to be 
caused by a volatile “liquidity spiral” between both markets (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 
2009). In the modified contagion model, investors tend to substitute growth for income in a 
crisis; yet at the same time, shocks increase the risk that investors will hit their funding 
limits, which, as yields decline, leads to a liquidation of positions in bonds as lower income 
streams are associated with an increased risk of capital constraints (Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen, 2009). As a consequence, an unstable “liquidity spiral” between the two markets 
is the result, causing both asset classes to become more volatile and an increase in stock-
bond correlations. 
The increase in stock-bond correlations reported is robust during the debt crisis for 
stock-bond relationships involving all stock indexes and bond yields of the UK, US and 
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Germany at a time when stock markets of those countries are rising. However, according to 
the Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) model, such a scenario would coincide with relaxed 
funding constraints on investors to undertake activit ies that generate greater liquidity and a 
decline in volatility in the asset markets.
17
 As a consequence, the increase in stock-bond 
correlations observed during the debt crisis for the major countries contradict the findings 
implied by Baur and Lucey (2009) who postulate that a “flight from quality” and a decline in 
liquidity in the bond market would arise at a time of rising stock prices. Finding an increase 
in stock-bond correlations suggests that contagion is not necessarily restricted to negative 
events and falling stock prices as also implied by previous studies (King and Wadhwani, 
1990; Koutmos, 1996). On the other hand, for correlations involving Spanish and Italian 
bonds, our results also indicate that investor induced contagion does diminish after the 
banking crisis until the end of 2009. Negative DCC estimates from 2010 onwards suggest 
further evidence of investor induced contagion, but this time, caused by the portfolio 
rebalancing effect during the sovereign debt crisis. Whilst this is consistent with the findings 
of previous studies (Hartmann et al. , 2004; Connolly et al., 2005; and Baur and Lucey, 
2009), this is indicative of a change in the transmission mechanism in different market 
conditions.   
An added dimension of this paper is that we consider the transmitting effects of a 
change in financial market confidence indicators on the transmission channel of the stock-
bond relationship. The inclusion of two barometers of risk is motivated by the findings of 
previous studies that view the TED spread (Brunnermeier, 2009; and Melvin and Taylor, 
2009) and VIX index (Low, 2004) as containing useful information on the state of the credit 
market and investor confidence; this, in turn, has a causal impact on the behavior of different 
asset classes (Lashgari, 2000 and Andersson et al., 2007). Our findings suggest that a major 
                                                             
17
 This period also coincides with the large scale QE programmes investigated by Gagnon et al. (2011), Joyce 
et al. (2011) and Neely (2011) outlined in footnote 6 that have caused bond prices (yields) to remain high (low) 
in a highly liquid market at a time of rising stock prices. 
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driving force of investor induced contagion is risk aversion during the banking and debt 
crises. Interestingly, this is counter balanced by evidence of an inverse relationship between 
credit market liquidity and stock-bond correlations. As a result, a widening of TED spreads, 
i.e., funding illiquidity conditions, observed in Figure 1 appears to reduce investor induced 
contagion caused by the wealth effect during the banking crisis. This implies that some 
investors engage in portfolio rebalancing and a “flight to quality” , a dynamic that is 
consistent with the results of Baur and Lucey (2009). A narrowing of TED spreads during 
the debt crisis contributed to the wealth effect for the majority of stock-bond relationships as 
well as the portfolio rebalancing effect for correlations involving Spanish and Italian bonds.  
The intuition behind these results can generally be found in the liquidity channel 
postulated by Chordia et al. (2005) where the banking crisis characterized by a lack of 
liquidity and a high degree of uncertainty causes investors to liquidate their positions in high 
risk assets in exchange for low risk assets. Ultimately, this causes a shift in liquidity away 
from the stock market to the bond market. Conversely, the debt crisis characterized by 
narrow TED spreads and rising stock prices in the major markets will encourage investors to 
buy high risk assets, making the bond markets less liquid. When added together, this leads to 
a negative stock-bond relationship, which nests neatly with the correlation estimates 
reported for Spanish and Italian bonds.  
Exploring the difference in DCC estimates with and without the TED spread and VIX 
index in the EGARCH model provides greater insight into the role of both risk barometers 
on the source of investor induced contagion over a period of time. The key finding reported 
is the manifestation of the wealth effect arising from credit market liquidity and the level of 
risk aversion in the pre-crisis period of 2007 and especially during the banking crisis. The 
results are repeated for the majority of stock-bond relationships during the debt crisis with 
the exception of correlations involving Spanish and Italian bonds where a manifestation of 
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the portfolio rebalancing effect is reported. This is consistent with previous studies that find 
contagion only arises in times of a crisis (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 1999; and Chiang et al., 
2007).  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
We provide evidence in support of the investor induced contagion hypothesis during 
the banking crisis and European sovereign debt crisis for stock-bond relationships. We find 
that the source of contagion during the banking crisis is the wealth effect that spreads across 
borders due to the drying up of liquidity from the stock and bond markets. However, a 
mixed picture is reported for the debt crisis where we report some evidence in favor of the 
portfolio rebalancing hypothesis as the reason behind the spread of the crisis for correlations 
involving Spanish and Italian bonds. Our results also indicate that risk aversion during the 
banking crisis contributes to the wealth effect in all instances. However, for stock-bond 
correlations involving Spanish and Italian bonds, we have also established that increased 
risk appetite magnified the portfolio rebalancing effect during the debt crisis.  
Taken together, our findings imply that transmission mechanisms that define the 
relationship between asset markets within a country and beyond change as a result of a 
financial crisis. Additionally, our results offer important insights to policy makers. The 
evidence which supports the existence of a liquidity channel in explaining how a crisis 
spreads, in light of credit market liquidity conditions and levels of risk aversion, implies that 
policy makers should consider whether liquidity levels in the financial markets are 
maintained through interventionist policies, particularly in periods of market stress. Finally, 
our results also pose questions on the unintentional consequences of central bank 
intervention in undertaking QE programmes on the way a crisis spreads. Such an assertion is 
borne out by overwhelming support for investor induced contagion sourced by the portfolio 
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rebalancing hypothesis for stock-bond correlations involving Spanish and Italian bonds from 
2010 onwards. Overall, our findings provide striking evidence on the time varying nature of 
stock–bond relationships over different market conditions suggesting that investor induced 
contagion explains how a crisis spreads within a country and beyond its borders. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Unconditional Correlations Between Stock and Bond Markets  
 FTSE Russell CAC DAX IBEX FTSE UK US FRANCE GERMANY SPAIN ITALY 
 100 3000 40 30 35 MIB 1-3 10+ 1-3 10+ 1-3 10+ 1-3 10+ 3 10 1 10 
Mean    0.011   0.012 -0.002  0.026 -0.001 -0.024 -0.159 -0.018 -0.081 -0.030 -0.113  0.020 -0.072 -0.035  0.013  0.016 -0.052  0.009 
St.dev    1.249   1.362  1.467  1.428 1.489 1.559  4.960  0.626  4.637  1.406  4.367  1.092  16.51  1.334  4.052  1.303  4.460  1.251 
Skewness    0.145
** -0.357
**
  0.068  0.046  0.075 -0.046 0.753
**
 0.523
**
 -0.734
** 
-0.452
**
 1.391
** 
-0.059
** 
 3.485
** 
-0.017  0.433
** 
-1.126
** 
 0.158
** 
-0.895
*  
Kurtosis    8.479
**
  9.765
**
 7.294
**
 6.890
** 
6.686
** 
6.132
** 
43.90
**
 230.21
**
 14.05
**
 5.038
**
 64.76
** 
3.506
** 
142.24
** 
-4.744
** 
25.92
** 
13.92
** 
 12.18
** 
13.56
*  
Q(12)    56.41
**
  47.67
**
 43.14
** 
22.47
* 
27.25
** 
38.81
** 
239.98
**
  19.10
* 
66.22
**
 151.51
**
 196.43
** 
44.37
** 
230.98
** 
29.92
** 
142.74
** 
130.11
** 
587.31
** 
79.08
*  
 
FTSE100 
 
1 0.570 0.902 0.842 0.819 0.828 0.213 0.261 0.360 0.368 0.168 0.259 0.095 0.324  0.017  0.107 0.065  0.073 
Russell    1 0.603 0.627 0.558 0.569 0.157 0.191 0.259 0.233 0.130 0.192 0.050 0.245  0.011   0.075 0.030  0.039 
CAC40    1 0.914  .896 0.908 0.239 0.292 0.379 0.401 0.177 0.292 0.095 0.396  0.008  0.079 0.090  0.026 
DAX30     1 0.825 0.841 0.219 0.280 0.356 0.378 0.165 0.274 0.091 0.359  0.010  0.105 0.067  0.053 
IBEX35      1 0.893 0.244 0.274 0.356 0.378 0.168 0.261 0.118 0.398  0.063  0.018 0.086  0.061 
FTSE MIB       1 0.258 0.296 0.373 0.391 0.161 0.281 0.105 0.423 -0.047 -0.024 0.076 -0.087 
UK 1-3        1 0.308 0.398 0.353 0.193 0.265 0.077 0.450  0.019  0.014 0.060 0.031 
 10+         1 0.337 0.378 0.201 0.379 0.060 0.438  0.039  0.225 0.070 0.191 
US 1-3          1 0.548 0.323 0.404 0.073 0.449  0.063  0.219 0.096 0.182 
 10+           1 0.267 0.525 0.100 0.642  0.063  0.231 0.099 0.202 
FRANCE 1-3            1 0.531 0.065 0.371  0.132  0.225 0.122 0.216 
 10+             1 0.098 0.775  0.100  0.433 0.144 0.429 
GERMANY 1-3              1 0.125  0.019 -0.028 0.027 0.023 
 10+               1  0.022  0.190 0.127 0.153 
SPAIN 3                 1  0.383 0.025 0.293 
 10                 1 0.022 0.824 
ITALY 1                  1 0.035 
 10                   1 
                     
Notes: The asterisks ** and * represent significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. The grey shaded area is the unconditional stock-bond correlation for the whole sample. 
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Table 2: DCC-EGARCH (1,1) Estimations – Country Stock and Bond Market Returns 
 QE Adjustment Market Risk Factors Conditional Variance Model Diagnostics 
Index  γ1 α1 α2            LB(6) LB(12) 
FTSE100   0.0736
** 
  -0.0258
a 
  0.0007
a 
   -0.0682
** 
0.9847
**
 0.0862
**
 -0.1396
**
 4.9636 7.2810 
   (0.025)    (0.013)   (0.004)    (0.012) (0.002) (0.015) (0.010) [0.55] [0.84] 
Russell 3000  0.1280
**
 0.0793
**
      0.0007
*
  0.0004
* 
 -0.0652
**
 0.9832
**
 0.0845
**
 -0.1351
**
 5.0176 7.6638 
   (0.034) (0.023)     (0.0003) (0.0002)  (0.013) (0.002) (0.015) (0.011) [0.54] [0.81] 
CAC40    0.0910
*
         -0.0799
**
 0.9775
**
 0.1107
**
 -0.1570
**
 9.7300 10.837 
   (0.046)         (0.012) (0.003) (0.016) (0.011) [0.14] [0.54] 
DAX30            -0.0886
**
 0.9748
**
 0.1261
**
 -0.1369
**
 5.7245 7.8531 
            (0.013) (0.003) (0.017) (0.009) [0.46] [0.80] 
IBEX35        0.0048
a 
  0.0005
a 
  -0.1055
**
 0.9776
**
 0.1470
**
 -0.1294
**
 7.8395 13.196 
        (0.003)  (0.0003)   (0.012) (0.003)2 (0.016)1 (0.009) [0.25] [0.36] 
FTSE MIB            -0.0874
**
 0.9853
**
 0.1187
**
 -0.1130
**
 3.7516 6.6119 
            (0.011) (0.002) (0.014) (0.008) [0.71] [0.88] 
Maturity 
UK 1-3   -0.1697
a 
  -0.0499
** 
     -0.0597
**
 0.9995
**
 0.0823
**
 -0.0483
**
 0.5450 2.1775 
    (0.099)   (0.017)      (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) [0.99] [0.99] 
 10+    -0.0585
** 
0.1572
** 
-0.0392
** 
-0.1297
** 
-0.0165
**    -0.1250
**
 0.9265
**
 0.0825
**
 -0.2696** 0.1871 0.2624 
     (0.015) (0.012)  (0.002)  (0.030)  (0.002)    (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) [0.99] [1.00] 
US  1-3     -0.0339* -0.0180** -0.0332
* 
-0.0094
* 
-0.0180
**   -0.0334
**
 0.9987
**
 0.0468
**
 -0.0615
**
 8.9988 11.749 
       (0.010)  (0.006) (0.014)  (0.005)  (0.006)   (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) [0.17] [0.47] 
 10+    0.1444
** 
-0.0219
*   -0.0106
a 
-0.0161
** 
-0.0191
**  -0.0761
**
 0.9922
**
 0.1045
**
 -0.0498
**
 5.2068 14.358 
     (0.041)  (0.009)    (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)  (0.009) (0.002) (0.011) (0.007) [0.52] [0.28] 
FRANCE 1-3   0.0487
a 
         -0.0851
**
 0.9995
**
 0.1144
**
 -0.0552
**
 5.9047 17.121 
    (0.027)          (0.008) (0.001) (0.010) (0.006) [0.43] [0.15] 
 10+          0.0004**  -0.0847
**
 0.9916
**
 0.1099
**
 -0.0367
**
 13.398 17.206 
           (0.0002)  (0.010) (0.002) (0.013) (0.007) [0.04] [0.14] 
GERMANY 1-3  0.0567
*
 -0.2529
a 
        -0.0974
**
 0.9989
**
 0.1315
**
 -0.0529
**
 7.2210 10.453 
   (0.026)  (0.140)         (0.008) (0.001) (0.011) (0.007) [0.30] [0.58] 
 10+            -0.0924
**
 0.9950
**
 0.1216
**
 -0.0350
**
 9.3980 11.977 
  
 
          (0.010) (0.002) (0.012) (0.009) [0.15] [0.45] 
SPAIN 3  0.1179**   -0.0103
*
 -0.0123** -0.0304**  -0.0014**   -0.09437
**
 0.9961
**
 0.1444
**
 -0.0046 9.776 11.380 
  
 
(0.035)   (0.0039) (0.002) (0.006)  (0.0002)   (0.005) (0.001) (0.008) (0.007) [0.13] [0.50] 
 10  0.0471* -0.0909
a 
 -0.0062*  -0.0109
**
   0.0003*   -0.1051** 0.9941** 0.1417** 0.0491** 7.0067 14.367 
   (0.023)  (0.051)   (0.003)   (0.003)  (0.0002)   (0.010) (0.002) (0.013) (0.008) [0.32] [0.28] 
ITALY 3  0.0854
**
         0.0006
a 
 -0.1341** 0.9977** 0.1902** 0.0237** 1.9373 5.6783 
   (0.030)        (0.0003)  (0.008) (0.002) (0.010) (0.006) [0.93] [0.93] 
 10   -0.0761
a 
      0.0004*   -0.1157** 0.9914** 0.1555** 0.0557** 16.709 23.049 
     (0.0451)      (0.0002)   (0.011) (0.002) (0.014) (0.008) [0.01] [0.03] 
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Table 3: DCC(Z)-EGARCH Risk Factor Model: Stock-Bond Correlations (Short Dated Bond Yields)  
  Russell 3000 CAC40 
  UK US FRANCE GERMANY SPAIN ITALY  UK US FRANCE GERMANY SPAIN ITALY 
Γ10  
 
 0.2684
**
    
 
0.4337
**
 0.3998
**
 0.3917
**
 0.1004
**
   
    (0.075)     (0.105) (0.114) (0.110) (0.019)   
ρ  0.998**    0.9990** 0.9834** 0.9988** 0.9988** 0.9982**  0.9833** 0.9875** 0.9844** 0.9693** 0.9988** 0.9977** 
  (0.001)    (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) 
Transmission effects – country a  
Γ11,i        0.0707
*
      
        (0.034)      
Γ12,i              
              
Γ13,i  -0.0448
**
 -0.048
** 
-0.1393
*
 -0.0842
**
 -0.0370
**
         
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.060) (0.025) (0.001)         
Γ14,i             0.0020
*
 
             (0.001) 
Γ15,i  0.0003
**
 0.0005
**
 0.0010
**
 0.0005
**
  0.0005
**
   0.0011
**
    0.0005
**
 
  (8.42E-5) (8.47E-5) (0.0003) (0.0001)  (0.0001)   (0.0004)    (0.0001) 
Γ16,i  0.0004
**
 0.0012
**
 0.0007
**
 0.0005
**
 0.0011
**
 0.0004
**
       0.0011
**
 
  (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0002) (7.76E-5) (0.0003) (0.0001)       (0.0003) 
Transmission effects – country b  
Γ11,j  -      -  -    
  -      -  -    
Γ12,j 
 
-   0.0013
*
   -  -    
  -   (0.0006)   -  -    
Γ13,j  -      - -0.1055
*
 -    
  -      -  (0.054) -    
Γ14,j  -      -  -    
  -      -  -    
Γ15,j  -        0.0010
*
- 0.0008
**
 - 0.0029
**
 0.0005
**
 
  -       (0.0004) (0.0003) - (0.0008) (0.0002) 
Γ16,j  -   -0.0002
*
 -0.0006
*
  - 0.0008
*
 - 0.0032
*
   
  -   (7.62E-5) (0.0003)  - (0.0004) - (0.002)   
χ
2
(6)  3.6122 5.3993 3.5376 6.0984 0.5163 0.1305  2.3983 1.9739 3.5946 2.5295 0.4219 0.1305 
  [0.73] [0.49] [0.74] [0.41] [0.99] [1.00]  [0.88] [0.92] [0.73] [0.87] [0.99] [1.00] 
LB(6)  6.5759 4.8388 7.7137 56.167 2.7931 6.7748  2.9683 4.7866 2.1919 5.3473 5.1576 6.7748 
  [0.36] [0.57] [0.26] [0.00] [0.83] [0.34]  [0.81] [0.57] [0.90] [0.50] [0.52] [0.34] 
LogL  -1786.44 -2035.8 -4734.30 -2745.59 -668.67 -3438.10  -4689.34 -4499.03 -5401.72 -6199.26 -2844.26 -3438.10 
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Table 3: continued 
  IBEX35 FTSE MIB 
  UK US FRANCE GERMANY SPAIN ITALY  UK US FRANCE GERMANY SPAIN ITALY 
Γ10  0.3350
**
 0.3048
**
 0.5982
**
 1.0852
**
    0.3313
**
 0.2889
**
3 0.2935
**
 0.1042
**
   
  (0.090) (0.096) (0.133) (0.194)    (0.092) (0.096) {0.096) (0.019)   
ρ  0.9860** 0.9895** 0.9749** 0.9665** 0.9985** 0.9978**  0.9863** 0.9905** 0.2935**  0.9678**  0.9976**  0.9983**  
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) 
Transmission effects – country a  
Γ11,i           -0.1220
*
   
           (0.054)   
Γ12,i              
              
Γ13,i   -0.0130
**
 -0.0251
**
  -0.0373
**
        
   (0.006) (0.007)  (0.009)        
Γ14,i     0.0009
**
         
     (0.0003)        0.0029
**
 
Γ15,i  0.0014
**
 0.0010
**
 0.0023
**
  0.0006
**
   0.0014
*
 0.0013
**
 0.0021
**
 0.0029
*
  (0.0007) 
  (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0007)  (0.0001)   (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.001)  0.0014
**
 
Γ16,i   0.0035
**
  0.0004
*
     0.0022
*
   (0.0003) 
   (0.001)  (0.0002)     (0.001)    
Transmission effects – country b  
Γ11,j              
              
Γ12,j              
              
Γ13,j        0.3287
*
      
        (0.139)      
Γ14,j      0.0018
*
      0.0013
**
  
      (0.0007)      (0.0004)  
Γ15,j      0.0007
*
      0.0006
**
  
      (0.0003)      (0.0002)  
Γ16,j              
              
χ
2
(6)  5.8873 4.0207 7.7774 2.0233 0.6494 5.1899  3.0439 3.1946 3.4875 2.2674 1.0449 1.6143 
  [0.44] [0.67] [0.25] [0.92] [0.99] [0.52]  [0.80] [0.78] [0.75] [0.89] [0.98] [0.95] 
LB(6)  4.6430 4.3898 2.2651 3.5108 12.552 9.3483  3.8078 5.5880 2.7080 3.6115 3.2060 14.229 
  [0.59] [0.62] [0.89] [0.74] [0.05] [0.16]  [0.70] [0.47] [0.85] [0.73] [0.78] [0.03] 
LogL  -4508.26 -4460.17 -6029.26 -6289.30 -3261.56 -4876.79  -4777.25 -4381.12 -5337.94 -6291.19 -3706.726 -4937.35 
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Table 4: DCC(Z)-EGARCH Risk Factor Model: Stock-Bond Correlations (Long Dated Bond Yields)  
  Russell 3000 DAX30 
  UK US FRANCE GERMANY SPAIN ITALY  UK US FRANCE GERMANY SPAIN ITALY 
Γ10  1.3724
**
  0.2411
**
     0.3317 0.6645
**
 0.3558
**
 0.3321
**
   
  (0.186)  (0.073)     (0.036) (0.151) (0.108) {0.110)   
ρ  0.9338** 0.9989** 0.9848**  0.9979**  0.9984**  0.9979**   0.8887 0.9786
**
 0.9848
**
 0.9890
**
 0.9976
**
 0.9975
**
 
  (0.008) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.022} (0.002) 
Transmission effects – country a  
Γ11,i  0.0174
*
       0.0793
*
   0.0450
*
  
  (0.009)       (0.038)   (0.022)  
Γ12,i         -0.0261
*
 -0.0248
*
 -0.0227
*
   
         (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)   
Γ13,i     -0.1156
**
 -0.0955
**
        
     (0.032) (0.033)        
Γ14,i              
              
Γ15,i  0.0028
**
 0.0003
**
 0.0006
*
  0.0004
*
         
  (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0003)  (0.0002)         
Γ16,i  0.0004
*
  0.0005
*
 0.0017
**
 0.0010
**
        
  (0.0002)  (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)        
Transmission effects – country b  
Γ11,j  -         -   
  -         -   
Γ12,j  - 0.0267
**
     
 
  -  -0.0257
**
 
  - (0.009)        -  (0.009) 
Γ13,j  -         -   
  -         -   
Γ14,j  -         -   
  -         -   
Γ15,j  -         -   
  -         -   
Γ16,j  -   -0.0007
**
      -   
  -   (0.0002)      -   
χ
2
(6)  3.6672 1.0332 6.0714 11.876 1.1692 10.60547  9.0423 6.8459 18.741 13.161 2.1132 3.1585 
  [0.72] [0.98] [0.42] [0.06] [0.98] [0.10]  [0.17] [0.34] [0.00] [0.04] [0.91] [0.79] 
LB(6)  8.7621 7.0813 2.6159 6.3597 10.424 8.5272  4.9903 7.9171 4.4232 6.4405 5.7602 5.7657 
  [0.19] [0.31] [0.86] [0.38] [0.11] [0.20]  [0.55] [0.24] [0.62] [0.38] [0.45] [0.45] 
LogL  -6756.81 -2994.36 -4859.72 -3263.93 -3328.86 -3366.98  -8498.47 -5820.50 -5716.98 -5494.54 -4635.70 -4762.95 
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Table 4: continued 
  IBEX35 FTSE MIB 
  UK US FRANCE GERMANY SPAIN ITALY  UK US FRANCE GERMANY SPAIN ITALY 
Γ10  0.1727
**
 0.7541
**
 0.3814
**
 0.3050
**
     0.3367
**
 0.5840
**
 0.3011
**
 0.2688
*
   
  (0.024) (0.160) (0.112) (0.108)    (0.037) (0.140) (0.101) (0.104)   
ρ  0.9379** 0.9742** 0.9829** 0.9901** 0.9845** 0.9987**  0.8862 0.9805** 0.9867**  0.9913**  0.9982**  0.9982**  
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001)  (0.010) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Transmission effects – country a 
Γ11,i              
              
Γ12,i        -0.1060
**
 -0.0360
**
 -0.0420
**
 -0.0402
**
 -0.0232
**
 -0.0260
**
 
        (0.045) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) 
Γ13,i            0.0198
*
  
            (0.010)  
Γ14,i             0.0020
**
 
             (0.0007) 
Γ15,i             0.0007
*
 
             (0.0003) 
Γ16,i              
              
Transmission effects – country b 
Γ11,j -             
 -             
Γ12,j - -0.0252
*
    -0.0163
*
        
 - (0.011)    (0.008)        
Γ13,j -             
 -             
Γ14,j -    0.0047
**
 0.0021
**
      0.0018
**
  
 -    (0.0017) (0.0006)      (0.0006)  
Γ15,j - 0.0013
*
    0.0011
**
      0.0006
*
  
 - (0.0006)    (0.0003)      (0.0002)  
Γ16,j -             
 -             
χ
2
(6)  4.6294 46.144 24.895 18.552 3.3865 8.6340  6.8379 4.6523 28.520 12.495 4.7612 20.912 
  [0.59] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.76] [0.20]  [0.34] [0.59] [0.00] [0.05] [0.57] [0.00] 
LB(6)  3.6761 5.2635 5.3746 4.6297 2.5697 11.780  5.2334 11.652 6.7137 6.4713 13.537 7.4972 
  [0.72] [0.51] [0.50] [0.59] [0.86] [0.07]  [0.51] [0.07] [0.35] [0.37] [0.04] [0.28] 
LogL  -7248.15 -6155.21 -5934.50 -5532.16 -6861.19 -4672.50  -8554.50 -5695.32 -5660.26 -5530.91 -4678.67 -4920.74 
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Figure 1: The Implied Volatility (VIX) Index of Investor Risk Appetite 
 
Note: The country codes for the VIX index of investor confidence are: UK: UK, US: US, FR: France, BD: 
Germany, EU: Euro-zone. 
 
Figure 2: The TED Spread Measure of Credit Market Liquidity
 
Note: The country codes for the three month TED spreads are: UK: UK, US: US, FR: France, BD: Germany, 
ES: Spain and IT : Italy. 
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Figure 3: DCC Estimates on Stock-Bond Relationships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The country codes for DCC estimates involving short dated and long bond yields are: UK: UK, US: US, FR: France, 
BD: Germany, ES: Spain and IT : Italy. 
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Figure 4: The Impact of Credit Market Liquidity and Investor Confidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The country codes for DCC estimates involving short dated and long bond yields are: UK: UK, US: US, FR: 
France, BD: Germany, ES: Spain and IT : Italy. 
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